Veliki intervju, Big Interview: Lucian Valsan

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Lucian Valsan je izjemno lucidni geopolitični, politično filozofski, praktično politični analitik, poliglot, oče Freedom Alternative (oglejte si ga:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LNHp98hHq-g). Sicer pa povsem navaden romunski fant. Pred meseci sem ga imel priložnost spoznati v Mariboru, danes pa vam serviram privilegij: intervju z njim.

  1. Kdo je Lucian?

Lucian je romunski fant, ki je vpleten v politiko, odkar pomni 🙂 Še preden sem imel pravico voliti, sem bil v politiko že vključen v nekaterih lokalnih volilnih kampanjah. Imel sem dovolj časa spoznavati, kako deluje politika na teoretski in kako na praktični ravni.

  1. Kaj je Freedom Alternative?

Ime izhaja iz moje frustracije nad političnim diskurzom v Evropi med leti 2013-2015, ko so bile vse “alternative”, na voljo na glavnem političnem odru, le različne možnosti socializma. Kaj pa kaj svobode za spremembo? Po tem ključu sem prišel do imena.

Za zdaj je Freedom Alternative razmeroma ohlapno strukturirana mreža liberalno-konzervativnih ljudi, ki se ne strinjajo z vsem, vendar se strinjajo, da je država prevelika in da sedanja Evropska unija napreduje v napačno smer. Iz te mreže so se pojavili kanali na Youtubu v angleškem in romunskem jeziku, v bližnji prihodnosti pa upamo, da bomo vplivali na čim več novih desničarskih organizacij, ki bi se pojavile v vsej Evropi, še posebej na območju Intermariuma.

Ne bomo dobili vsega, česar si želimo, toda če ne bomo storili ničesar, tudi dobili ne bomo ničesar. In ena od stvari, ki jih počnemo, je izobraževanje. Izkušnje so pokazale, da večina ljudi nikoli ni slišala primernega libertarsko-konzervativnega argumenta. Ljudje nam pišejo na podcastu v romunščini, da so pri nas prvič slišali nekoga govoriti o privatizaciji, svobodnih trgih, svobodi in osebni odgovornosti.

Freedom Alternative je, za zdaj, torej predvsem izobraževalno orodje.

  1. Kaj je Intermarium?

Intermarium je geografsko območje med Severnim , Jadranskim in Črnim morjem. Samo ime je izum poljskega državnika Józefa Piłsudskega, ki je imel v mislih politični projekt, ki bi združil ozemlja v Srednji in Vzhodni Evropi (v tistem času Poljske, Romunije, Češkoslovaške, Madžarske, Jugoslavije, Ukrajine, Belorusije in baltskih držav), pa tudi Finske. Projekt je na koncu propadel, ker se je začela druga svetovna vojna, preden bi se lahko začeli ukvarjati s temeljnimi vprašanji.

Današnja politična inkarnacija Intermariuma je t.i. Pobuda treh morij (3SI), ki združuje Poljsko, Romunijo, Madžarsko, Češko, Slovaško, Slovenijo, Avstrijo, Hrvaško, Bolgarijo in baltske države (Litva, Estonija in Latvija).

3SI je manj ambiciozen kot projekt Piłsudskega, vendar je že opravil nekaj stvari, na primer pripravil poslovne skupnosti na območju Intermariuma, da tesneje sodelujejo in opravijo nekatere ključne infrastrukturne investicije, ki imajo tudi geopolitične posledice (kot je plinovod med Constanţo in Dunajem, železniško progo od Hrvaške do severne Poljske ali avtocesto Via Carpattia).

Fizična povezanost je glavni cilj projekta 3SI. Pomembno je, da se s tem projektom ne prehiteva. To je delo, ki zahteva najmanj 20 let. Tudi Rim ni bil zgrajen v enem dnevu.

  1. Kateri politični spekter je najbolj smiseln?

Tisti s štirimi osmi, ki omogoča razlikovanje med ekonomijo in drugimi stališči. Lahko bi si celo zamislili politični spekter s tremi osmi, ki bi bil še bolj natančen, vendar bi za večino ljudi bil preveč zapleten.

  1. Levica – desnica ali Progresivizem – konzervatizem?

Oboje. Kot sem rekel, sta ekonomska in družbena drža lahko ločeni. Danes je to kar preveč očitno – na primeru velikih korporacij, katerih ekonomski odnos je večinoma desničarski, družbeni odnos pa izrazito levičarski (progresiven).

Romunski komunisti pred letom 1989 so imeli skrajno levičarski ekonomski pogled na svet, a vobče izjemno konzervativno stališče do družbe.

Na primer, romunska komunistična stranka je splav kriminalizirala, razvezo naredila težjo in kriminalizirala tudi homoseksualnost.

Popolnoma mogoče je biti družbeno konzervativen in levičarski (kot večina komunistov v Intermariumu iz leta 1970 ali v ZSSR) ali pa družbeno progresiven in ekonomsko desničarski (kot mnogi libertarci).

6.Klasični liberalizem – libertarstvo, alternativna desnica – glavni tok ameriškega konzervatizma – vaše stališče o tem.

“Klasični liberalizem” je fraza, ki politično filozofskim teoretikom ustvarja veliko glavobolov, ker gre za kompleksen dežnični termin. Klasični liberalizem je bolj ali manj tisto, kar so verjeli ustanovni očetje ZDA v času, ko so lansirali ustavo. Vztrajam da pri tem, kar so verjeli in ne tistem, kakor so to izvajali. Nekateri od ustanovnih očetov so verjeli, da je suženjstvo napačno, kar je rezultiralo v tem, da razglasitev neodvisnosti ne pomeni parole “življenje, svoboda in lastnina” (kot je bilo sprva namenjeno), temveč “življenje, svoboda in prizadevanje za srečo”. Nekateri očetov so namreč verjeli, da bi to lahko tlakovalo pot ukinitvi suženjstva v prihodnosti.

Klasični liberalizem daje zelo malo sodb o inherentni identiteti, veliko več pa moralnih sodb, ne da bi nujno poskušal te sodbe vsiljevati prek države. Na primer, klasični liberalci verjamejo, da je poroka dragocena institucija, vendar si obenem prizadevajo, da bi bila kar se da bolj ločena od države.

Malo ljudi ve, da je klasična liberalna tradicija, da ohranja poroko zasebno – tako, da jo urejata sekularna skupnost ali cerkev (če tako izbere skupnost) – brez vmešavanja države. Če bi se ustanovni očetje vrnili v prihodnost in videli primere istospolnih porok, bi se najverjetneje zgrozili.

Libertarstvo je klasični liberalizem brez moralnega ozadja. Razlika med libertarci in klasičnimi liberalci je, da prvi ne vlagajo preveč truda v moralne premisleke.Libertarci in klasični liberalci si prizadevajo za proste trge, majhno državo (minarhizem) in tip družbe, ki zasleduje slogan “živi in pusti živeti”.Razlika pa nastane, ko se razpravlja o neekonomskih vprašanjih, ali o vprašanjih, ki so le delno ekonomska in deloma nekaj drugega.

Na primer, klasični liberalci in libertarci se pogosto ne strinjajo glede priseljevanja. Klasični liberalci verjamejo, da narodni značaj obstaja in da je ena od smiselnih vlog države, da ta značaj brani pred spremembami čez noč, ki jih prinašajo velike mase priseljencev.Libertarcev pa po drugi strani značaj naroda ne zanima ali preprosto ne verjamejo, da bi vprašanje značaja moralo imeti prednost pred ekonomskimi vprašanji, ko gre za razpravo o tem ali je priseljevanje dobro ali ne.

“Alternativno desnico” je te dni težje opredeliti. Včasih je pomenila etnonacionalizem – ki ni nujno skladen s prostim trgom. Toda danes je v očeh prevladujočih medijev vse “alternativna desnica”.

Torej, če skušam odgovoriti na to vprašanje…Recimo, DA JE alternativna desnica socialni konservatizem s skrbjo za etnično nacionalistične interese belcev. Pomembno je poudariti belcev, ker se črnski etno-nacionalizem ne imenuje “alternativna desnica”, ampak “Tudi črnska življenja štejejo” (Black Lives Matter).Vsi ti – libertarstvo, klasični liberalizem in alternativna desnica (kot definirani zgoraj) – se pogosto znajdejo v nasprotujočem se odnosu do prevladujoče doktrine ameriškega konzervatizma.

To je zato, ker ima  sodobni in prevladujoči ameriški konzervativizem svoje korenine v sedemdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja, ko je William F. Buckley ustvaril koalicijo, ki še danes obstaja in je v veliki meri znana kot »konzervativno gibanje«. To ne pomeni, da je bila ta koalicija nujno rigidna, vendar je način, na katerega bila zgrajena, sam po sebi izključeval določena stališča in organizacije. Osebno verjamem, da je bila večina teh odločitev (za izključevanje) dobra, seveda pa se vsi ne strinjajo.

Glavne točke spora med ameriškim konzervativizmom in nekaterimi od teh frakcij so osredotočene na zunanjo politiko (glavni tok je bolj “sokolski”, v smislu, da zagovarja vojaška posredovanja in agresivno zunanjo politiko, drugi so nekoliko bolj izolacionistični), velikost in obseg države (vsi se strinjajo, da bi morala biti država manjša , vendar na konzervativce, ki so del establishmenta, letijo obtožbe, da za kaj takega storijo premalo) in kulturo (prevladujoči konzervativizem se zdi s strani širše kulture paraliziran). Nekatera teh vprašanj se navsezadnje obravnavajo s prihodom predsednika Trumpa, katerega uspeh gre vsaj deloma pripisati pritiskom nekaterih marginalnih skupin in drugim političnim prerazporeditvam zadnjih let.

7.Alternativna desnica – vaše stališče.

Kot sem že povedal, je navsezadnje precej zapleteno vedeti, kaj je “alternativna desnica”.

Ne vem, koliko prostora imate za ta razgovor ali koliko so vaši bralci pripravljeni prebrati, ampak bom svoj odgovor razdelil na “kaj je alternativna desnica” in “kako jo dojemajo drugi”, preden bom izrazil svoje stališče. Alternativna desnica, kot jo razumem, ima svoj izvor v delu Paula Gottfrieda in njegovega “vajenca” Richarda B. Spencerja, ki ne samo, da si je izmislil izraz, temveč postavil temelje ideologije, ki je bolj ali manj fašistična ideologija (fašistična v italijanskem smislu); in sicer prepričanje v veliko državo, ki je izraz naroda na nerazdružljiv način.

Z drugimi besedami, država je narod in narod je država – in nič ne sme biti dovoljeno izven tega razmerja. To je klasični mussolinistični fašizem, vendar je prilagojen sodobnim časom. Ena od prilagoditev je prav, da se izognemo temu, da jo imenujemo “fašizem”, ker je postal obremenjen izraz (predvsem zaradi neumnosti medijev, pa tudi splošne nevednosti prebivalstva).

In tukaj zadeve pričnejo biti zmedene. Ker so mediji in vse preveč agitpropovce združili prvo prepričanje (namreč, da so skupine neenake predvsem zaradi svojih inherentnih značilnosti) z drugo in trdili, da je dovolj, da se prve označi (ali, če si dovolim, ožigosa) kot “alternativno desnico”. In tako smo pristali v današnjem stanju zmede. Ker prepričanje, da so ljudje neenaki predvsem zaradi nekaterih njihovih inherentnih lastnosti, ni prepričanje alternativne desnice. Prepričanje, da lahko na teh razlikah gradiš javne ukrepe – jih dela prepričanje alternativne desnice. Naj navedem primer: Študije so pokazale, da medtem ko drži, da so moški in ženske v povprečju podobno inteligentni in da imajo podobne sposobnosti, za moške velja, da so bolj ekstremni. V znanosti se temu reče “teorija večje moške variabilnosti”.

To pomeni, da so moški manj povprečni in bolj ekstremni. V preprostem jeziku: obstaja več moških kot ženskih idiotov in tudi več moških kot ženskih genijev. Bolj kot  se približujete robovom zvončaste krivulje (Opazka uredništva: Bell Curve – sociološki termin, ki ga skoval Charles Murray v istoimeni knjigi The Bell Curve), ki jo gledate, bolj verjetno je, da boste tam našli moškega, ne glede na meritev: fizična moč, duševne motnje, intelektualne sposobnosti, v bistvu karkoli.

To je dejstvo. To ni politična izjava. Toda v sedanjem podnebju vas preprosta konstatacija tega dejstva ožigosa kot alternativnega desničarja – čeprav bi vas alternativno desnico delalo zares to, da bi iz teh dejstev npr. derivirali javne ukrepe kot so, da se ženskam ne sme dovoliti študirati tehničnih in naravoslovno – matematičnih smeri, ker so moški za kaj takega bolj primerni. To bi bilo pravo stališče alternativne desnice. Če pa opazimo, da so med 0.1% najinteligentnejših moški nesorazmerno zastopani, to ni in ne more biti politično stališče.

Poleg tega obstaja tudi politični spor znotraj alternativne desnice, ki je pripeljal do razdora med t.i. “Alt-Lite” in “Alt-Right – pri čemer se slednji identificirajo kot “prava” alternativna desnica, ostale pa zmerjajo s “cucks” (opazka uredništva: izraz izhaja iz cuckold in se pogosto uporablja v pornografiji kot izraz za belca, ki nemočno ali celo odobravajoče opazuje, medtem ko mu črnec “natepava” žensko) ali s kakšnim podobnim žaljivim izrazom.

Moje glavno nesoglasje z alternativno desnico je, da je to po sebi kolektivistična ideologija, kar je vidik, zaradi katerega alternativna desnica ni združljiva z mojimi vrednotami.

Moj drugi problem z alternativno desnico je, da tega ni mogoče razširiti. Z drugimi besedami, alternativna desnica lahko ima, v najboljšem primeru, smisel znotraj nekaterih relativno marginalnih segmentov ameriške in morda kanadske družbe (tudi Avstralije, morda?) – ne pa tudi Evrope.

To je zato, ker je v Evropi “biti bel” precej brez pomena celo za težke ksenofobe in rasiste, ki jim je mar za to. Ker tudi tiste bolj trdovratne ljudi, ki jih ta ideologija morda zanima, še vedno pesti vprašanje: ali je posameznik ali skupina ljudi nenadoma v redu samo zato, ker je bel, čeprav iz konkurenčnega / “sovražnega” naroda ?

Na primer, Romuni in Madžari se na genetski ravni ne razlikujejo – čeprav se najhujši ksenofobi v vsaki državi med seboj prezirajo. Podobne primere bi lahko navajali tudi za Poljake in Nemce, Srbe in Hrvate in tako naprej. Izkaže se, da »biti bel« preprosto ni dovolj. In to je v mnogih pogledih res tudi v Ameriki.

Beli tip iz Teksasa in beli tip iz Minnesote sta lahko tudi kot da sta iz popolnoma drugačnih planetov. Teksačani so po svojem vrednostnem sistemu precej blizu vzhodnoevropskim prebivalcem (tradicija, družina, orožje, neodvisnost, individualizem itd.), medtem ko so Minnesočani, ki so večinoma skandinavskega porekla, bolj podobni Švedom (kolektivizem, trdo delo zaradi dela samega, mehki totalitarizem, prisilna raznolikost itd.).

Torej, če povzamem, so notranja protislovja alternativne desnice na praktičnem nivoju in njeno nasprotovanje relativno svobodni družbi dovolj, da mi ni preveč pri srcu. Dodajte k temu dejstvo, da je Spencerjev “think tank” v poslu prevajanja dela kremeljskega ideologa Aleksandra Dugina v angleški jezik, in imate popolno sliko.

Navkljub temu pa menim, da bo alternativna desnica še nekaj časa z nami, ker včasih postavljajo dobra vprašanja in izpostavljajo smiselne probleme in verjamem, da naloga ljudi, ki se z njimi ne strinjamo ni, da se nad njimi zgražamo, ampak da skušamo iskati superiorne odgovore na njihova vprašanja in superiorne rešitve za probleme, ki jih izpostavljajo. “Alternativna desnica” je pričela izgubljati del svoje privlačnosti, ko je pričelo postajati normalno, da se problematizira masovne migracije.

8.Evropski konzervatizem proti ameriškemu konzervatizmu

Nisem povsem prepričan, da taka stvar, kot je “evropski konzervatizem”, obstaja. Britanska konzervativna stranka, na primer, skuša ohraniti ultra-liberalno kulturno skrajno levo družbo, ki je bolj ali manj podrejena Bruslju in t.i. borcem za družbeno pravičnost znotraj akademskega sveta.

Poljski konzervativci (Pravo in pravičnost) si prizadevajo razstaviti levico na vsakem koraku v poljski družbi in ohraniti temeljno katoliško družbo, ki v gospodarskem smislu sprejema modernost, a je skeptična do modernosti na področju kulture.

Kateri je evropski? Odgovor je oboje. Zato nisem prepričan, da obstaja “evropski konzervatizem”. Poleg tega so izzivi z desne od nekaterih dominantnih nominalno konzervativnih strank v evropksih državah postali precej normalni (PVV na Nizozemskem, AfD v Nemčiji, Medborgerlig Samling, Sverigedemokraterna in Högerpartiet de konservativa na Švedskem, Dansk Folkeparti na Danskem, Fremskrittspartiet na Norveškem, Lega v Italiji, FPÖ v Avstriji in tako naprej). Nekateri so celo postali del koalicijskih vlad v svojih državah. Kateri izmed njih je konzervativen? CDU ali AfD? Moderaterna ali Sverigedemokraterna?

Kar želim povedati, je, da je Evropa daleč od združene in je zaradi tega težko govoriti o evropskem konzervatizmu brez omembe manjkajočih razlik v odtenkih ali celo brez da bi se popolnoma motili, kakor hitro želite o tem govoriti. Na splošno pa so konzervativne stranke v Evropi bolj naklonjene državnim rešitvam. Mislim, da je to nekaj, kar jih združuje: večina konzervativcev v Evropi ni apriori proti debeli državi, medtem ko so ameriški konzervativci očitno v taboru minarhistov (opazka uredništva: zagovornikov vitke države).

To seveda ne pomeni, da v Evropi ni zagovornikov male države med konzervativci in zagovornikov velike države med konzervativci v ZDA.

Druga razlika, na katero lahko opozorimo (izpeljana iz prve), je, da evropski konzervativci niso apriori naklonjeni prostim trgom, kar je vidik, ki me, če sem iskren, spravlja ob pamet.

9. Državljanski nacionalizem ali (etnični) nacionalizem?

Mislim, da ta dva pojma nista izključujoča oziroma, da nista nujno izključujoča.

Verjamem, da je zdrava mera obeh pomembna za zdravje dežele.

Zanikanje etnične komponente večine narodov je očitno napaka. Hkrati je predlog, da lahko tvoriš celotno družbo brez vsake omembe narodnosti v isti meri napačen in očitno naiven.

To je težava, ki se je primarno pojavljala v novem svetu (Brazilija, ZDA, Kanada, Argentina) in precej manj v starem svetu. Ko, na primer, slišiš švedske elite trditi, da “švedsko” ne obstaja, je povsem jasno, da si se znašel v umobolnici.

Toda z družbeno elito, ki nas na silo poskuša vse narediti “multikulturne” – bo to postala težava tudi v Evropi, čeprav še vedno precej manj kot v novem svetu.

Ta novi potisk je za večino evropskih dežel povsem nenaraven. Na primer, v Romuniji smo stoletja živeli v miru ob Tatarih, Italjanih in Srbih. Bili smo multikulturni dolgo preden so nam ti klovni začeli pridigati o “raznolikosti” in en od razlogov, da je bilo to možno je bila zdrava mera tega kar bi danes imenovali “državljanski nacionalizem” brez, da bi hkrati pozabili kdo smo.

In to je bistvena razlika napram današnjim “državljanskim nacionalistom”, ki nas prepričujejo, da se vsak od kjerkoli nasvetu lahko priseli v naše dežele in v par letih postane Slovenec, Šved, Romun,Francoz, itd. To je tisto kar mislim z “zdravo mero obojega”. Ideja, da se lahko preselim na Kitajsko in postanem Kitajec je očitno trapasta. Jaz nikoli ne bom Kitajec. Največ kar lahko dosežem je, da se v kitajsko družbo integiram v meri, ki mi omogoča delovanje in morda bodo moji otroci Kitajci. To je dosegljivo z zdravo mero etničnega in državljanskega nacionalizma.

Dejstvo je, da je pojem “državljanskega nacionalizma” francoskega izvora, pa še oni ga razumejo kot dodatek in razsvetlitev čistega tribalizma – in ne kot polni nadomestek.

Charles de Gaulle je del tega razložil v letu 1959, ko je govoreč o Alžirski neodvisnosti dejal: “Zelo dobro je, da obstajajo rumeni Franoczi, črni Francozi, rjavi Francozi. Dokazujejo, da je Francija odprta za vse rase in ima univerzalno vabilo. Toda pod pogojem da ostanejo majhna manjšina. Drugače, Francija ne bi bila več Francija. Še vedno smo predvsem evropejsko ljudstvo bele rase, grške in latinske kulture in krščanske vere.”

Po mojem prepričanju je to zdrava mera tako državljanskega kot etničnega nacionalizma.

Češka na primer ima cvetočo vietnamsko skupnost (kakih 80.000 ljudi) in Nguyen (izrazito vietnamsko priimek) je sedaj med 10 najbolj pogostimi priimki v državi. Kakor je videti to ni povzročilo nobenih težav in napetosti. To je zato ker je češka družba dovolj samozavestna in robustna, da lahko vsrka te posameznike in tudi zato ker so se imigranti sami potrudili in se integrirali v širšo družbo.

Ampak ali bi bilo to možno, če bi namesto 80.000 ljudi (0.8% populacije) vietnamska manjšina nenadoma narastla na 500.000 ljudi (5% populacije) v enem letu? Ne vem, vendar sumim da bi se stvari prek nočni močno spremenile.

Jasno je, da ta pogovor še zlepa ne bo zaključen. V preteklosti so se mnoge evropske države preveč osredotočale na etnični nacionalizem in v sedanjosti se mnoge evropske države preveč osredotočajo na državljanski nacionalizem. Iskanje pravega ravnovesja in zdrave mere obeh je vse prej kot lahko opravilo. Verjamem pa, da mi v območju Medmorja (Intermarium op.prev.) že imamo nekaj kar je precej blizu zdravi meri.

10. Konzervatizem in rasa, konzervatizem in kultura, konzervatizem in narodnost.

Menim, da bi se moral konzervatizem zagotovo precej bolj osredotočati na kulturo kot se danes.

Politika je po strugi navzdol od kulture. In kulturo povsem obvledujejo ne-konzervativci. In to se pozna.

Glavni doprinos, ki ga kozervativci lahko in bi ga morali prispevati je, da vse kulture niso enake. In da so nekatere kulture izrazito slabše.

Ne verjamem, da obstaja neločljiva povezava med kulturo in raso, toda obstaja šibka povezava med kulturo in nacionalnostjo.

V ameriškem besednjaku je “nacionalnost” (“ethnicity” op. prev.) evfemizem za “raso” vendar v evropi vemo bolje. Kot sem omenil že prej, jaz in Viktor Orban sva očitno iste rase – vendar so najine etnične razlike zelo pomenljive.

Glede rase, bi rekel da imam precej več skupnega s Thomasom Sowellom (črnim ameriškim konzervativcem) kot pa imam s svojim komunističnim sosedom iz iste ulice (s katerim si delim narodnost in raso). Ideje so zelo pomembne.

Še en primer: Ljudstvi Botswane in Zimbabweja. Komaj ločljivi po rasi – a vendar povsem drugačni kulturi. S povsem različnim izzidom – Botwswana je uspešna dežela primerljiva s Portugalsko in Slovaško med tem ko Zimbabwe… ne ravno toliko.

Podobno lahko primerjamo Etiopijo in Sudan. Očitno ljudstvi iste rase, vendar povsem različnih kultur. In na podoben način bi lahko našteval še nekaj časa – poanta je, da je povezava med kulturo in raso bodisi šibka ali neobstoječa.

Povezava med nacionalnostjo in kulturo je nekoliko močnejša, zagotovo – ker nacionalnost pomeni več kot samo biologijo. Če en mesec starega otroka rojenega v Slovenijo preselimo v Avstralijo bo še vedno rojen kot slovenec, toda če živi celo življenje v Avstraliji bo po kulturi zagotovo Avstralec.

Zato menim, da bi se morali konzervativci bolj osredotočati na kulturo – četudi to pomeni soočanje z neokusnimi obtožbami “rasizma” in “ksenofobije” s skrajne levice.

Če sem zaradi prepričanja, da je Islam vse prej kot kompatibilen z našimi družbami “rasist” potem bi morda tisti, ki opletajo s takimi žaljivkami morali pojasniti “Jihadi John”-a povsem belega britanskega možaka, ki se je znašel v položaju kjer je obglavljal ljudi v imenu Kalifata. Moje prepričanje je, da je ta možak tudi nekompatibilen z našo kulturo.

V osnovi, morajo konzervativci najti svoj notranji pogum in poriniti tudi skozi trapaste obtožbe. To se je začelo dogajati v zadnjem času, toda konzervativci so več desetletij nemudoma obmolknili, ko jih je kdo nazval z rasisti. To se mora končati. Ker če postane pogovor nemogoč, potem totalitarizem postane neizbežen.

11. Ali so klasični liberalci liberalni, če niso konzervativni?

V sodobnih časih so klasični liberalci, zagotovo, del širšega “konzervativnega” šotora.

To je zato ker so sodobni liberalci vse kaj drugega kot liberalni. Nič “liberalnega” ni v omejevanju izražanja, od države vsiljeni “morali” in orjaških fiskalnih bremenih.

Resda je to odvisno od dežele. V Romuniji in Avstraliji je “Liberalna Stranka” še vedno bolj kot ne Liberalna v klasičnem smislu.

Toda drži, da so klasični liberalci pretežno del konzervativnga šotora – v smislu, da poskušajo ohraniti liberalni ideal katerega so izvrgli tisti, ki sami sebe nazivajo z liberalci.

12. Judovski problem; ali so vsi Judje levičarji ali so tudi kakšni, ki so združljivi z evropskim konzervatizmom.

Ne verjamem, da Judovski problem obstaja in ideja, da so vsi Judje levičarji se mi zdi prav spektakularno zabita.

Judje so za “-izme” to kar so italjani za operete ali romuni za kiber varnost ali informacijsko tehnologijo v splošnem.

Najboljše operete so spisali Italijani. To ne pomeni, da ne obstajajo odlične operete katere so spisali ne-italijani. Ali da so ne-Italijani privzeto izključeni iz industrije operet. Pomeni pa, da v splošnem, kadar boste razpravljali o operetah boste slej ko prej naleteli na Italijane.

Analogija z Romuni in IT je še boljša. Zavoljo različnih vzrokov so se romuni izkazali kot zelo dobri v informacijski tehnologiji – še posebaj na področju kibernetske varnosti.

Bitdefender (proizveden v Romuniji) se konsistentno uvršča na vrh testov glede zaznavanja zlovešče kode katere izvajajo neodvisni laboratoriji. Pred letom 2004 sta bila prva in druga najboljša antivirusna programa romunska – dokler ni enega od njiju kupil Microsoft.

Preživljam se kot pogodbenik na področju IT in ko se znajdem v mednarodnem kontekstu kibernetske varnosti, kadarkoli imam stike s podjetji kjerkoli na svetu, je verjetnost, da je vsaj del njihovega sistema zasnoval romun oziroma, da uporabljajo rešitve ustvarjene v Romuniji izjemno visoka.

Ali to pomeni, da obstaja romunska zarota za prevzetje globalne kibernetske varnosti? Seveda ne. Pomeni pa, da dlje ko nekdo govori o kibernetski varnosti, večja je verjetnost da bo naletel na romunsko ime. In to je v dobrem in slabem zato, ker so Romuni nesorazmerno zastopani tudi v kibernetskem kriminalu, ne samo v kibernetski varnosti.

Isto velja za Jude v politiki. Judje so nesorazmerno zastopani v domala vseh političnih ideologijah.

Prej v tem intevjuju sem govoril o delu Paula Gottfrieda in njegovega vajenca Richarda B. Spencerja v contexu Alt-Right. Paul Gottfried je judovski intelektualec. Torej tudi v politični misli, ki (vsaj) tolerira antisemitizem najdete judovskega misleca.

Isto velja, seveda, za večino ideologij levega krila.

Hkrati isto velja tudi za ne-levičarske ideologije. Ayn Rand, Ludvig von Mises in Milton Friedman so bili vsi Judje. Mises je bil svetovalec Margaret Thatcher, Friedman je bil 70 let vpleten v ustvarjanje politik na desnici v ZDA in Ayn Rand je odločujoče vplivala na kulturo v smer samozadostnosti, osebne odgovornosti in individualizma.

V sodobnem času, ima AfD judovski vpliv, večinoma pod vodstvom podskupine “Judje za AfD” ustanovljeno s strani Dimitrija Schulza, judovskega moža rojenega v SSSR. Odsek vsebuje približno 1500 članov.

Seveda to ne ustavi, niti ne bo ustavilo širše levice (vključujoč judovske levičarje), da ne bi klicali AfD “antisemitične” kot trop NPC-jev (op. prev: https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/npc-wojak) kar v resnici tudi so. A to je postransko vprašanje.

Poanta je, da Judje izkazujejo povišano zanimanje za politiko kot večina ne-Judov – toda to povišano zanimanje je daleč od strankarsko opredeljenega, kar je razmišljanje katerega skušnjavi podležejo mnogi.

Ben Shapiro (Judovski konzervativec) je omenil, da kultura igra vlogo. Judje, ki so rojeni kot Judje vendar se ne identificirajo s kulturo (npr. ne prakticirajo Judaizma) imajo bolj levičarske vzgibe, za razliko od Judov, ki so aktivno vključeni v judovsko kulturo in so skoraj brez izjeme na desni.

Isto drži za Izrael. Najbolj popularna stranka Likud, je izrazito desničarska in vlada Izraelu v koaliciji z dvema socialno konzervativnima strankama, ki se bolj kot ne opredeljujeta s klasično liberalno zornim kotom (čeprav nekoliko bolj avtoritarnim).

S temi dejstvi v mislih, menim, da je narobe sploh omenjati, da so vsi ali večina Judov na levici. Dejstva tega nikakor ne podpirajo. Judje so politično izjemno raznoliki, ravno tako kot ne-Judje.

Vprašal si me ali so Judje “združljivi z evropskim konzervatizmom” toda, kot sem razložil že pri prejšnjem vprašanju, pojem “evropskega konzervatizma” je zelo nejasen.

V Evropi ni veliko karizmatičnih konzervativnih ideologov in osebnosti v kontinentalni Evropi in posledično tudi Judov ni prav veliko. Razumeti morate, da biti konzervativec še vedno pomeni precejšnje tveganje za kariero posameznika.

En od Judov, ki pride na pamet je Denis Prager, ki je med konferenčno turnejo v dveh romunskih mestih, med levičarji povzročil veliko vznemirjenje, ko je dejal da so meje dobre, da je nacionalizem dober in se zahvalil Bogu, da še vemo kaj je Romun, medtem ko je na Švedskem težje vedeti kaj je Šved.

  1. Ali obstaja nemški problem?

 Heh. To se je začelo kot interna šala znotraj mreže Freedom Alternative, vendar je zdaj postalo zelo resna stvar – čeprav ne na način, kot si morda mnogi predstavljajo.

Večina katastrof v Evropi ima nemško poreklo. Navsezadnje je bil Marx nemški. Bismarck, ustanovitelj prve socialistične države, je bil tudi nemški. Zrušitev Rima je bila v rokah nemških barbarov. Skoraj vsaka tragedija v Evropi ima nemško poreklo – vključno s sedanjim z Angelo Merkel, ki samovoljno odpira meje Evrope celotnemu planetu, na škodo preostale Evrope. In kako so reagirali nemški ljudje? Dali so Merklovi še en mandat na funkciji!

Nekaj je v nemški psihi in nemškem načinu dela, ki redno vodi v negativne zunanje učinke za preostalo Evropo. Šalim se le na pol, ko rečem, da se zdi, da si Nemci preprosto ne morejo pomagati pri tem, da drugih ljudi ne morejo pustiti pri miru.

Ali to pomeni, da so vsi Nemci taki? Ne, seveda ne. Toda to pomeni, da je del nemške kulture, to je tisto, kar naredi Nemce nemško, nagnjen k takim stvarem.

Prav tako ne pomeni, da ni tragedij, ki nimajo nemškega izvora – in tukaj bi omenil francosko revolucijo kot primer tragedije nenemškega izvora.

Verjamem, da je to še poslabšalo dejstvo, da se je Nemčija združila okoli Prusije in Bismarcka – namesto okoli Bavarske, ki je bila bolj konzervativna, bolj skeptična do velike države in bolj zadržana glede nihanja ladje (kar katoliko tradicionalno so).

Ne vem, kakšna je rešitev (ali če obstaja), vendar mislim, da bi to, da Nemčije kot združene geopolitične enote ne bi več bilo, precej pripomoglo k temu, da se vzorec ne bi več ponavljal.

Zato še naprej verjamem v prvotni moto Nata: poskrbeti, da Američani ostanejo, Rusi odidejo, Nemci pa nimajo nobene moči. In tudi zato sem globoko zaskrbljen zaradi vsake pobude v smeri “evropske vojske”, ker menim, da je Evropska unija nadaljevanje Nemčije z drugimi sredstvi …Celo evroobmočje je v praksi projekt, ki krepi Nemčijo na račun vseh drugih v tem območju.  Ne glede na to, ali je bil to začetni namen ali ne.

 

  1. Rusija proti ZDA; evropski konzervativci: kakšno stališče naj bi imeli do odnosa med omenjenima geopolitičnima gigantoma?

 Zagotovo v korist ZDA.Poleg zgoraj omenjenega nemškega vprašanja obstaja še nekaj drugih razlogov.

1) Ekonomski. Rusko gospodarstvo je manj kot nezdravo. To je katastrofa. Rusko gospodarstvo je manjše od italijanskega. Za primerjavo je ameriško gospodarstvo večje od Združenega kraljestva, Kanade, Južne Koreje in večine kontinentalne Evrope skupaj. Torej, iz fiskalno konzervativnega vidika, je smiselno, da se ZDA da prednost.

 

2) Civilizacijski. ZDA je predvsem vnuk Evrope, ki se je obogatil, zaslovel in postal kul, ker ni upošteval slabih nasvetov dedka, a obdržal jedro.

Mi smo na točki, ko se lahko veliko naučimo od ZDA, veliko manj pa to velja v drugi smeri. Primerjalno se od sodobne Rusije težko karkoli naučimo.

3) Ideološki. Medtem ko mnogi “centristi” in “nepristranski ljudje”, ki se pretvarjajo, da niso ruski “agenti”, radi trdijo, da sta obe “slabi” in “imperialistični” – je dejstvo, da sta daleč od tega, da bi bili podobni. In verjamem, da lahko v Intermarijumu / 3SI vidimo to bolj jasno kot morda nekateri naši prijatelji v nekdanjem Zahodnem bloku. Prav zaradi tega, ker smo živeli v razširjenem ruskem imperiju in lahko naredimo bolj smiselno primerjavo.Ne glede na to, kako gledate na to stvar, je preprosto bolje biti z ZDA. In da ne bi bilo pomote, “nevtralnost” ni možnost. Tudi Avstrija in Švica (primera zgodovinske nevtralnosti) še vedno ohranjata aktivne povezave z ZDA in, če bi prišlo do težav, dvomim, da bi se Avstrija borila skupaj z Vladimirovičem Putinom.

To ne pomeni, da morajo konzervativci odobriti ali pogoltniti vsako stvar, ki prihaja iz ZDA, samo zato, ker prihaja iz ZDA. To bi bilo podrejenost in, povsem odkrito, neumnost.To pomeni, da se imajo konzervativci veliko naučiti iz ameriške ustavne tradicije in od mnogih ameriških konzervativcev.

Glede geopolitičnih vprašanj bi morali konzervativci v Evropi (zlasti v vzhodni Evropi) ohraniti dobre odnose z republikansko in demokratsko stranko, ker je čezatlantska povezava izrednega pomena za naše države, zlasti v pobudi za tri morja.Ampak, kot je povedal en poljski novinar, s katerim sem se nedavno pogovarjal: mi [s čimer je mislil konzervativce v Intermariumu] moramo biti sposobni povedati demokratom, da bi bili navdušeni nad sodelovanjem na področju infrastrukture, vojaških zadev in ekonomije, ko pa prihaja do kulturnih zadev, bomo vljudno zavrnili kakršno koli pomoč od demokratov, dokler bodo demokrati takšni, kot so zdaj v ZDA – politična stranka, ki je v osnovi nezdružljiva z našimi družbami.

  1. Kaj je duginizem?

 Kratek odgovor: Duginizem je rusocentrični imperialistični pogled na svet, ki ga je razvil Aleksandr Dugin, kremeljski ideolog.

Daljši odgovor…lahko traja tudi do 30 strani. Eden mojih najbolj priljubljenih videoposnetkov na Freedom Alternative je tisti, kjer skoraj 90 minut detaljno razlagam duginizem. Posnetek se imenuje “Kaj je duginizem in zakaj šteje”. Posnetek je v angleščini in upam, da ga bo videlo še več ljudi.

Ni se vam treba strinjati z mojim mnenjem o duginizmu, vendar pa je poznavanje dejstev o njem pomemben korak nasproti pošteni razpravi o njem.

Duginizem kot ideja (ali celo ideologija) ni spektakularno drugačen od tistega, kar smo vedeli že od nekdaj v zvezi z Rusijo v smislu imperialnih pogledov na svet.

Kar dela duginizem posebnega, je njegov  praktični pristop. V nasprotju s prejšnjimi poskusi Rusije, da bi uničila Zahod, se duginizem izkaže za veliko bolj učinkovitega, deloma zato, ker je bolj fleksibilen v smislu, da lahko Dugin osebno in njegovi privrženci delajo z vsemi, dokler “trenutni politični projekt “(njegove besede) to dovoljuje.

V praksi to vidimo skozi Duginovo sodelovanje s Koalicijo radikalne levice (Syriza) v Grčiji, hkrati pa sodeluje z alternativno desnico (Spencerjev nacionalni institut za politiko že nekaj časa objavlja Duginove knjige v angleščini).

Za duginiste je značilno tudi, da nimajo nobenih problemov z združevanjem revolucionarnega marksističnega sporočila (levičarski populizem – Kot je Jean-Luc Mélenchon v Franciji), in družbeno konzervativnega sporočila.

To je eden od načinov, kako prepoznati sopotnike in privržence duginizma – vprašajte jih o Rusiji in Ukrajini ter o ekonomiji. Če “ne vedo”, ali bi morala Ukrajina obstajati in favorizirajo velik državni intervencionizem v ekonomiji, zagotovo niso konzervativni – tudi če kažejo neko obliko družbenega konzervativizma (npr. nasprotujejo splavu, istospolni poroki, podpirajo tradicionalno družino, itn.).

Duginizem je za desnico, kar je kulturni marksizem prinesel za liberalno levico.

Kulturni marksizem je povzročil, da so razumni liberalci in socialdemokrati sodelovali z najbolj barbarskimi režimi na svetu v imenu intersekcionalnosti.

Duginizem poskuša narediti podobno z zmernimi konzervativci in libertarci v imenu antiiestablishmentarizma.

Oba sta na več načinov temeljno protiameriška, proti judeokrščanski civilizaciji in naklonjena mnogo bolj totalitarističnim ureditvam.

Najbolj smešna stvar pri duginizmu je, ko vidim te tipe na strani alternativne desnice, ki ga promovirajo, potem ko je sam Dugin protibelski rasist, ki je dejal, da mu je edini cilj povzročati nered in rasne napetosti na zahodu, da bi s tem ruska subverzija bila lažja.

Druga najbolj smešna stvar pa je, ko dominantno levico nenadoma skrbi zaradi Rusije, potem ko je dalj časa bila sopotnica duginizma (čeprav mnogi med njimi najbrž nezavedno, pa vendar). (avtor intervjuja: Aleš Ernecl, urednik)

English version (original):

  1. Who is Lucian?                                                                                                                                                      Lucian is a Romanian guy who’s been involved in politics for as long as he can remember 🙂 Even before I had the right to vote, I was still in politics and was involved in a few local elections campaigns. I’ve had enough time to see both how theoretical politics work and practical politics.

       2. What is Fredoom Alternative?

The name comes from my frustration with the political talk in most of Europe in 2013-2015, when all the “alternatives” available on the mainstream political stage were various alternatives of socialism. How about some freedom for an alternative? That’s how I came up with the name.

For now Freedom Alternative is a loose network of libertarian-conservative people who don’t agree on everything but who do agree that the State is too big and the current European Union is heading in a wrong direction. From that network the English-language and the Romanian-language Youtube channels emerged and, in the near future, we’re also hoping to influence the new right-wing organizations that emerge allover Europe, but especially the Intermarium area.

We will not get everything we want, but, if we don’t do anything, we won’t get anything that we want. And one of the things that we do is education. Experience showed us that most people have never heard a proper libertarian-conservative case being made. People write to us on the Romanian-language podcast that it is the first time they’ve ever heard someone on “TV” talking about privatization, free markets, liberty and personal responsibility.

So Freedom Alternative, right now, is, first and foremost, an educational tool.

3. What is InterMarium?

The Intermarium is the geographical area between the North Sea, the Adriatic and the Black Sea.

The name itself comes from the Polish statesman Józef Piłsudski who envisioned a political project that would unite the territories in Central and Eastern Europe (at the time Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic States) as well as Finland. The project eventually failed because World War II started before the preliminary concerns could have been hashed out.

The present-day political incarnation of the Intermarium is the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) which unites Poland, Romania, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Austria, Croatia, Bulgaria and the Baltic States (Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia).

The 3SI is less ambitious than Piłsudski’s project was but it has already gotten a few things done – such as getting the business communities in the Intermarium area to work closer with each other and get the preliminary work done for some key infrastructure investments that also have geopolitical implications (such as the gas pipeline from Constanța to Vienna, the railway from Croatia to northern Poland or the Via Carpattia freeway).

Physical interconnectivity is the main goal in the 3SI project. It is important not to get over hyped with this project. This is a work that requires 20 years at the very least. Rome wasn’t built in a day either.

4. Political specter: what kind of it makes the most sense?

The one with four axes that allows for distinction between economics and other attitudes. One could even imagine a political compass (spectrum) with three axes which would be even more accurate but would also complicate things too much for most people.

5. Left wing – right wing or Proggressivism – Conservatism?

Both. As I said, economics and social attitudes can be separate. The present day shows this all too well – with mega corporations whose economic attitude is mostly right-wing but whose social attitudes are distinctively left-wing (Progressive).

The Romanian communists before 1989 had a clearly far-Left economic worldview but a generally conservative view on society. For instance, the Romanian Communist Party made abortion illegal, made divorce difficult and made homosexuality illegal.

It is perfectly possible to be socially conservative and left-wing (like most communists in the 1970s Intermarium or the USSR) or to be socially progressive and right-wing economically (like many libertarians).

6. Clasical liberalism, libertarianism, alt right vs mainstream american conservatism – your stance on these relations

“Classical liberalism” is a phrase that generates a lot of headaches among political pundits because it’s quite a large umbrella.

Classical liberalism is more or less what the founding fathers of the United States believed at the time when they drafted the Constitution. I insist on what they believed rather than what they implemented. For instance, some of the founding fathers believed slavery to be wrong – as a result the declaration of independence doesn’t say “life, liberty and property” (as it was intended) but “life, liberty and pursuit of happiness” since some founders thought this could pave the way in future for the abolition of slavery.

Classical liberalism makes very few judgments on inherent identity but makes a lot of judgments on morality, without necessarily seeking to impose those judgments via the State. For example, classical liberals believe that marriage is a precious institutions but they also seek to keep the State away from that institution.

Few people know that the inherent classical liberal tradition is to keep marriage private – regulated by the community or by the Church (if the community so chooses) – and not regulated by the State. If the Founding Fathers would come back today and see the “gay marriage” cases, they’d likely be appalled.

Libertarianism is classical liberalism without the moral background. The difference between libertarians and classical liberals is that the former don’t put too much effort into moral considerations.

Both libertarians and classical liberals pursue free markets, a small State (minarchism) and a generally live and let live type of society. The difference comes when non-economic issues are discussed or issues that are only partially economic and partially something else.

For example, classical liberals and libertarians disagree often times on immigration. Classical liberals believe that there is such thing as the character of a nation and it is one of the roles of the State to protect that character from being changed overnight by a gigantic influx of people. Libertarians, on the other hand, either don’t care about the character of the nation or simply don’t think it is a relevant issue in the context and, instead, the economic impact should be the focus on whether immigration is good or not.

The “alt-right” is harder to define these days. It used to mean ethno-nationalism – which is not necessarily consistent with the free market. But nowadays anything is “alt-right” in the eyes of the Cathedral Media.

So, to answer this question, let’s say “alt-right” is social conservatism with ethno-nationalistic concerns for white people. It’s important to note “for white people” because Black ethno-nationalism isn’t called the “alt-right” but Black Lives Matter.

All of these – libertarianism, classical liberalism and the alt-right (as defined above) – oftentimes find themselves on an adversarial relationship with the mainstream American conservatism.

This is because modern mainstream American Conservatism has its roots in the 1970s when William F. Buckley created the coalition that still holds today and that it is largely known as “the conservative movement”. That’s not to say that this coalition was necessarily rigid – but the way it was constructed it inherently excluded certain positions and certain organizations.

I personally believe that most of those decisions (to exclude certain factions) were good, but of course, not everyone agrees.

The main points of contention between mainstream American conservatism and some of these factions are centered around foreign policy (mainstream is more hawkish, the others are a bit more isolationist), the size and scope of the state (they all agree the state should be lower, but establishment/mainstream conservatism are accused of not having done enough to make that happen) and the culture (mainstream conservatism has been obliterated from the wider culture and seems paralyzed to it).

Some of those concerns are finally being addressed now with the advent of President Trump whose success is, in part, due to the push by some of these more marginal groups and other political realignments that have been happening over the last three years or so.

7. Alt right – your stance

As I said earlier, it’s getting quite complicated to know what is the “alt-right” after all.

I don’t know how much space you have for this interview or how much your readers are willing to read, but I will divide my answer into “what is the alt-right” and “perception” before uttering a stance.

The alt-right as I understand it, has its origins in the work of Paul Gottfried and his protégé Richard B. Spencer who not only invented the term, but laid the groundwork for the ideology – which is more or less a fascist ideology (fascist in the Italian sense); namely the belief in a big State that is the expression of the Nation in an inextricable way.

In other words, the State is the Nation and the Nation is the State – and nothing is to be allowed outside of this relationship. This is classical Mussolinian fascism but adapted to modern times. One of the adaptations is precisely to avoid calling it “Fascism” because it has become a loaded term (largely due to the stupidity of the media, but also the generalized ignorance of the populace).

What differentiates this form of collectivism from others are Gottfried’s (and Spencer’s) fundamental beliefs that groups are unequal primarily because of their inherent characteristics (race, sex, nationality) AND that you can implement policy based on those differences most of the time. Both beliefs are necessary for an alt-right stance.

And here’s where it gets confusing. Because the media and way too many pundits have conflated the first belief (namely that groups are unequal primarily because of their inherent characteristics) with the second and claimed that it’s enough to hold the first to be labeled (or, dare I say, smeared) as “alt-right”.

And that’s how we are in the mess we are today. Because the belief that people are unequal primarily because of some of their inherent characteristics is not an “alt-right” belief. The belief that you can implement policy on those differences makes it an alt-right belief.

Let me give you an example: Studies have shown that while men and women have largely similar abilities and intellect ON AVERAGE, men are more extreme. This is called in science “the greater male variability theory”.

What that means is that men are less average and more extreme.

In plain language: there are more male idiots than female idiots and also more male geniuses than female geniuses. The further on the edges of the bell curve you look, the more likely it is to find a man there, no matter the metric: physical strength, mental disorders, intellectual abilities, you name it.

This is a fact. It’s not a political statement. Yet in the current climate, stating this fact gets you smeared as “alt-right” -> when in reality, one would be alt-right if, from this fact, would derive the policy stance that, let’s say, maybe we shouldn’t allow women in STEM because clearly men are more suited. That would be an alt-right stance. Noticing that in the top .01% of intelligence, men are disproportionately represented is not, and cannot be, a political position.

On top of all of these, there’s also the political dispute among the factions of the organized alt-right – disputes which eventually led to the separation between something now called as “Alt-Lite” and “Alt-Right” – with the latter being the “true” alt-right while the others being smeared as “cucks” or some other slur.

My main disagreement with the Alt-Right is that it is an inherently collectivistic ideology, an aspect which makes it unpalatable to me and inherently incompatible with my values.

My second problem with the alt-right is that it is not scalable. In other words, the alt-right can, at best, make SOME sense within certain relatively marginal segments of the American and perhaps Canadian society (Australia too, maybe?) – but not Europe.

This is because in Europe, “being white” is pretty meaningless even to hardcore xenophobes and racists who may care about this. Because even the more hardline folks who may be tempted by this ideology, it still leaves the question: is an individual or a group of people suddenly okay just because they’re white, even though they’re from a competing/”enemy” nation?

For example, Romanians and Hungarians are indistinguishable on a genetic level – yet the hardline xenophobes in each country despise each other. Similar examples could be given with Poles and Germans, Serbians and Bosnians and so on and so forth. As it turns out, “being white” is simply not enough. And this is in many ways true in America as well.

A white dude from Texas and a white dude from Minnesota may as well be from entirely different planets. Texans are pretty close as a value system with Eastern Europeans (tradition, family, guns, independence, individualism, etc.) whereas Minnesotans, being of mostly Scandinavian extraction, resemble Swedes in value system (collectivism, hard work for its own sake, consensus-driven, soft-totalitarianism, forced diversity, etc.).

So, essentially, the alt-right’s inherent contradictions on a practical level, as well as its opposition to a relatively free society are enough to make me be less than fond of them.

Add to that the fact that Spencer’s “think tank” has been in the business of translating the Kremlin’s ideologue’s work – Aleksandar Dugin – into English, and you have a complete tableau.

With that said, the “alt Right” will be around for a while because sometimes they do ask good questions and raise legitimate points and I believe the task for people like me is not to shriek in horror but to instead come up with superiour answers.

The “alt Right” has started losing some of its appeal once it became okay to question mass immigration for instance.

8. European vs American conservatism

I am not entirely sure such thing as “European conservatism” even exists.

The British Conservative Party, for instance, seeks to conserve an ultra-liberal culturally far-Left society subjugated more or less to the whims of Brussels and the social justice warriors in Academia.

The Polish Conservatives (Law and Justice) seek to dismantle leftism at every step in Polish society and conserve a fundamentally Catholic society that embraces modernity in economic sense but is skeptical of cultural modernity.

Which one is European? The answer is both. That’s why I’m not convinced there is such thing as “European conservatism”.

Besides, challenges from the right of some of the mainstream nominally conservative parties in the countries of Europe have become pretty normal (PVV in the Netherlands, AfD in Germany, Medborgerlig Samling, Sverigedemokraterna and Högerpartiet de konservativa in Sweden, Dansk Folkeparti in Denmark, Fremskrittspartiet in Norway, Lega in Italy, FPÖ in Austria and so on). Some of them have even become part of the coalition government in their countries.

Which of them is conservative? CDU or AfD? Moderaterna or Sverigedemokraterna?

The point I am trying to make here is that Europe is far from united and, as such, it is hard to talk about something called “European conservatism” without missing nuances or even being outright wrong.

Generally, though, conservative parties in Europe tend to be more welcoming to State solutions. I guess that’s one unifying factor: most conservatives in Europe are not inherently against a big(ger) government; whereas American conservatives are clearly in the small-government camp.

Now that’s not to say there aren’t small-government conservatives in Europe or bigger government conservatives in the US, of course.

One other difference that could be noted (derived from the first one) is that European conservatives are not inherently pro-free markets, an aspect which drives me crazy, to be perfectly honest with you.

9. Civic nationalism vs (ethnic) nationalism

I don’t think the two are mutually exclusive. Or that they necessarily have to be mutually exclusive.

I believe that a healthy dose of both is what makes a country healthy.

It is clearly wrong to reject that there indeed is an ethnic component to most nations, but it is equally wrong (and clearly naive) to suggest that you can construct an entire society without any mention of ethnicity.

This used to be primarily an issue in the New World (Brazil, the USA, Canada, Argentina) and less so in the Old world (Europe).

When you hear Swedish elites, for instance, claiming there is no such thing as “Swedish” you’ve clearly hit the loony bin.

However, with an elite that aggressively pushes to make us all “multicultural” – this will become an issue in Europe too, though still less so than in the New World.

This new push comes as unnatural to most countries of Europe. For instance in Romania we’ve been living peacefully alongside Tartars, Italians and Serbs for hundreds of years. We were multicultural long before these clowns started lecturing us on “diversity” – and one of the reasons we were able to do that is because we had a healthy dose of what would now be called “civic nationalism” while not forgetting who we are in the process.

This is what’s different today with proponents of “civic nationalism” who would have us believe that anyone from anywhere in the world could move into our countries and in a few years at most he or she will be a Slovenian/Swede/Romanian/Frenchman/etc. This is what I mean by a “healthy dose of both”. The idea that I could move into China and become Chinese is ludicrous on its face. I will never be Chinese. The best I could hope is that I’d integrate good enough into the Chinese society so that I could function and maybe my children would be Chinese. That much is possible with a healthy dose of both civic and ethnic nationalism.

In fact, the whole notion of “civic nationalism” is of French origin but even they understood it as rather an addition and an enlightenment to pure tribalism – and not as a complete replacement.

Charles de Gaulle explained some of this back in 1959 when, speaking of Algerian independence he said: “It is very good that there are yellow French, black French, brown French. They show that France is open to all races and has a universal vocation. But [it is good] on condition that they remain a small minority. Otherwise, France would no longer be France. We are still primarily a European people of the white race, Greek and Latin culture, and the Christian religion.”

This is what I believe to be a healthy dose of both civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism.

Czechia for instance has a thriving Vietnamese community (about 80,000 people) and Nguyen (a distinctly Vietnamese name) is now in the top 10 most common surnames in the country. It seems this created no problems and no tensions. That’s because the Czech society is confident and robust enough to absorb these individuals and also the immigrants themselves have gone through the effort of integrating into the wider society.

But would this be possible if from 80,000 people (0.8% of the population) the Vietnamese minority would suddenly grow to 500,000 people (5% of the population) within one year? I don’t know, but I suspect things would be quite different overnight.

To be sure, this is not a debate that will be finished anytime soon. In the past many European countries were excessively focused on ethnic nationalism and in the present many European countries are excessively focused on civic nationalism. Finding the right balance and a healthy dose of both is not an easy task. I believe us in the Intermarium area, however, have something that is much closer to a decent balance.

10. Conservatism and race, conservatism and culture, conservatism and ethnicity

I think conservatism should focus a lot more on culture than it does today, for sure.

Politics is downstream from culture. And the culture is overwhelmingly dominated by non-conservatives. And it shows.

The main input that conservatives can (and should) bring is that not all cultures are equal. And that yes, some cultures are distinctly inferior.

I don’t believe there is an inherent link between culture and race, but there is a weak link between culture and ethnicity.

In the American parlance, “ethnicity” is an euphemism for “race” but in Europe we know better. As exemplified earlier, me and Viktor Orban are clearly of the same race – but our ethnic differences matter quite a lot.

As for race, I’d say I have more in common with Thomas Sowell (Black American conservative) than I have with my communist neighbor down the street (of the same ethnicity and race with me). Ideas matter quite a lot.

Another example: The people of Botswana and the people of Zimbabwe. Barely distinguishable by race – yet of an entirely different culture. And of entirely different outcome – Botswana is a prosperous place on par with Portugal or Slovakia while Zimbabwe… not so much.

Similarly, we could look at Ethiopia versus Sudan. Clearly peoples of the same race, but of entirely different cultures. And I could go on like this for a while – the point is that the link between race and culture is either weak or non-existent.

The link between ethnicity and culture is a bit stronger, for sure – because ethnicity means more than just biology. A one month old child born in Slovenia and moved to Australia may be Slovenian by birth, but if he or she lives his whole life in Australia, he will be Australian by culture, for sure.

So I believe conservatives should focus a lot more on culture – even if that means facing disdainful allegations of “racism” and “xenophobia” from the far-Left.

If believing, for instance, that Islam is far from compatible to our societies makes me a “racist” then maybe those who throw out slurs should explain “Jihadi John” – a perfectly white British bloke who ended up beheading people for the Caliphate. I believe that guy is incompatible with our culture too.

Basically, conservatives should find their inner courage to plow through even in face of ludicrous allegations. This has started to happen lately but for decades conservatives shut up whenever they were called racists. This has to stop. Because if we make debate impossible, we make totalitarianism inevitable.

11. Are clasical liberals liberal if not conservative?

In the modern days, classical liberals are, for sure, part of the wider “conservative” tent.

This is because modern-day liberals are anything but liberal.

There’s nothing “liberal” in speech codes, State-enforced “morality” or gigantic fiscal burdens.

Admittedly, this depends on the country. In Romania or Australia for instance, the “Liberal Party” is still more-or-less Liberal in the classical sense.

But yeah, by and large, classical liberals today are part of the conservative tent – in the sense that they try to conserve a liberal ideal that has been thrown out by those who purport to be liberals.

12. Jewish problem; are all jews left wing and are there some that are compatible with wuropean conservatism?

I don’t believe there is a Jewish problem and the notion that all Jews are left-wing strikes me as spectacularly dumb.

Jews are to “-isms” what Italians are for operettas or what Romanians are to cybersecurity or IT in general.

The best operettas have been written by Italians. That doesn’t mean there aren’t good operettas written by non-Italians. Or that non-Italians are inherently excluded from the operetta business. But it does mean that, by and large, when talking about operettas, you are going to talk about Italians at some point.

The analogy with Romanians and IT is even better. For various reasons, Romanians have turned out to be remarkably good in IT – especially in the cybersecurity sector.

Bitdefender (produced in Romania) consistently scores best protection in malware detection tests run by independent labs. Before 2004, the 1st and 2nd best antivirus software were Romanian – until one of them got bought by Microsoft.

I make my living as an IT contractor and when I’m in international cybersecurity context, whenever I have contact with a company from anywhere in the world, the likelihood of at least some of their system being designed by a Romanian or at least use solutions generated in Romania is very high.

Does that mean there’s a Romanian conspiracy to take over global cybersecurity? Of course not. But it does mean that the longer one talks about cybersecurity, the more likely it is to stumble upon a Romanian name. And this is for better and worse, because Romanians are disproportionately represented in cybercrime as well, not just cybersecurity.

The same holds true with Jews and politics. Jews are disproportionately represented in essentially all political ideologies.

Earlier in this interview I talked about the work of Paul Gottfried and his protégé Richard B. Spencer in the context of the Alt-Right. Paul Gottfried is a Jewish intellectual. So even in political thought that (at the very least) tolerates anti-Semitism you will find a Jewish thinker.

The same is true, of course, about most Left-wing ideologies.

But the same is true of most non-Leftist ideologies. Ayn Rand, Ludwing von Mises and Milton Friedman were all Jewish. Mises was an adviser to Margaret Thatcher, Friedman was involved in policy making on the Right for 70 years in the USA and Ayn Rand decisively influenced the culture towards self-reliance, personal responsibility and individualism.

In the present day, AfD has a Jewish influence, largely led by the sub-group “Jews for AfD” founded by Dimitri Schulz, a Jewish man born in the USSR. The chapter has around 1500 members.

Of course, this does not and will not stop the wider Left (including Jewish leftists) from calling AfD “anti-Semitic” like a bunch of NPCs they truly are. But that’s besides the point.

The point is that Jews manifest a slightly higher interest in politics than most non-Jews – but that slightly higher interest is far from partisan as many might be tempted to think.

Ben Shapiro (Jewish conservative) pointed out that culture plays a role. Jews who are only born Jewish but don’t identify with the culture (i.e. don’t practice Judaism) tend to be more left-wing whereas Jews who actively engage in the Jewish culture are almost universally on the Right.

The same is true in Israel. The most popular party is Likud, a distinctly right-wing party and it rules Israel in coalition with two socially conservative parties who more or less also subscribe to a classical liberal view (albeit slightly more authoritarian).

With these facts in mind, I believe it is wrong to even suggest that all or even most Jews are left-wing. The facts don’t bear that out at all. Jews are quite politically diverse just like non-Jews.

Now you ask me about Jews “compatible with European conservatism” but, as I explained in a previous question, the notion of “European conservatism” is quite murky.

There aren’t many charismatic conservative ideologues and figures in continental Europe so there aren’t many Jews either. You have to understand that being a conservative still comes with a huge risk to one’s career.

I guess one Jew that comes to mind would be Dennis Prager who, in a conference tour in two Romanian cities, ruffled a lot of leftist feathers when he suggested that borders are good, nationalism is good and thanked God we still know what a Romanian is while in Sweden it’s harder to know what a Swede is.

13. Is there a German problem?

Heh. This started as a running inside joke among the Freedom Alternative network but it has now become quite a serious point – though not in the way many would imagine.

Most catastrophes in Europe have a German origin. Marx was German, after all. Bismark, the founder of the first socialist state, was also German. The collapse of Rome was at the hands of German barbarians. Almost every tragedy in Europe has a German origin – including the current one with Angela Merkel single-handedly opening the borders of Europe to the whole planet at the explicit expense of the rest of Europe.

And how did the German people react? They gave Merkel yet another term in office!

There is something in the German psyche and the German way of doing things that periodically leads to negative externalities for the rest of Europe.

I am only half-joking when I say that it seems that Germans simply can’t help it from not leaving other people alone.

Now, does that mean all Germans are like that? No, of course not. But it does mean that part of German culture – that is, what makes Germans German – is prone to such things.

It also doesn’t mean that there aren’t tragedies that don’t have a German origin – and here I would mention the French Revolution as an example of tragedy not of German origin.

I believe this has been exacerbated by the fact that Germany got united around Prussia and Bismark – instead of around Bavaria which was more conservative, more skeptical of a big state and more concerned with not rocking the boat too much (as Catholics tend to be).

I don’t know what is the solution (or indeed if there is one) but I suspect that not having Germany as a united geopolitical entity would go a long way to prevent this recurring pattern of Germans harming the rest of Europe.

This is why I continue to believe in NATO’s initial motto: to keep the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down. And it’s also why I’m deeply concerned with any initiative in the direction of a “European army” – since I regard the European Union as a continuation of Germany by other means…

Even the Eurozone is, in practice, a project that strengthens Germany at the explicit expense of everyone else in the Eurozone. Whether that was the initial intent or not is besides the point.

14. Russia vs USA – european conservatives; which stance should they have on the main geopolitical issues concerning formentioned geopolitical giants?

In favor of the USA, for sure.

In addition to the German issue discussed above, there are several other reasons.

1) Economical. The Russian economy is less than unhealthy. It’s a disaster. Russia’s economy is smaller than Italy’s. By comparison, the American economy is larger than the UK, Canada, South Korea, and most of continental Europe COMBINED. So from a fiscally conservative perspective, it only makes sense to prioritize the USA.

2) Civilizational. The USA is, primarily, the grandchild of Europe who got rich, famous and cool by disregarding some of grandpa’s advice but while keeping the core. We’re at the point when the USA has things to teach to us and a lot less the other way around. By comparison, there’s essentially nothing to learn from modern-day Russia.

3) Ideological. While many “centrists” and “impartial people” pretending not to be Russian shills like to claim that both entities are “bad” and “imperialistic” – the fact of the matter is that they’re far from being similar. And I believe we in the Intermarium/3SI area can see this more clearly than perhaps some of our friends in the former Western Block. Precisely because we have lived in the extension of the Russian empire and can make a more sound comparison.

No matter how you look at it, it simply is better to be with the USA. And make no mistake, “neutrality” is not an option. Even Austria and Switzerland (posterchildren for neutrality) still maintain active connections with the USA and, if push comes to shove, I doubt Austria would fight alongside Vladimirovich Putin.

Now, that doesn’t mean conservatives have to approve or swallow every single thing that comes from the USA just because it comes from the USA. That would be subservience and, quite frankly, stupidity.

What this does mean is that conservatives have a lot to learn from the American constitutional tradition and from many of the American conservatives.

On geopolitical issues, conservatives in Europe (particularly Eastern Europe) should maintain good relations with both the Republican and the Democratic party because the transatlantic link is of utmost importance for our countries, especially in the Three Seas Initiative.

But, as one Polish journalist with whom I recently talked to told me: we [meaning conservatives in the Intermarium] need to also be able to tell the Democrats that we’d be thrilled to collaborate on infrastructure, military affairs and economics but when it comes to cultural matters, we will politely decline any help from the Democrats for as long as the Democrats are the way they are right now in the US – a political party fundamentally incompatible with our societies.

15. What is duginism?

The short answer: Duginism is the Russia-centric imperialist worldview elaborated by Aleksandr Dugin who happens to be the Kremlin’s ideologue.

The longer answer… well… it can be as long as 30 pages. One of my most popular videos on the Freedom Alternative is one where I explain Duginism in great details for almost 90 minutes. The clip is called “What is Duginism and why it matters”. It’s in English and I hope more people watch it. You don’t have to agree with my opinion about Duginism, but knowing the facts about it goes a long way towards at least discussing honestly.

Duginism as an idea (or indeed ideology) is not spectacularly different from what we’ve known since forever as coming from Russia in terms of imperial worldviews.

What makes Duginism special is its approaches in practicality.

Unlike previous attempts by Russia to subvert the West, Duginism turns out to be much more effective, in part because it is more flexible in the sense that Dugin personally and his followers can (and do) work with anyone as long as the “current political project” (his words) allows it.

In practice we see this through Dugin’s collaboration with the Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza) in Greece while at the same time collaborating with the alt-right (Spencer’s National Policy Institute has been publishing Dugin’s books in English for quite some time).

Also, Duginists have no qualm in coopting both a revolutionary Marxist message (left-wing populism – like Jean-Luc Mélenchon in France) and a socially conservative message.

This is one way to spot fellow travelers of Duginism – ask them about Russia and Ukraine and about economics. If they “don’t know” whether Ukraine should exist and they favor big state interventionism in economics, they’re definitely not conservative – even if they manifest some form of social conservatism (e.g. they oppose abortion, they oppose gay marriage, they favor intact families, etc.).

Duginism is to the right what cultural Marxism ended up being for the liberal left.

Cultural Marxism made sensible liberals and social-democrats to side with the most barbaric regimes in the name of intersectionality.

Duginism is trying to make sensible conservatives and libertarians to do the same in the name of anti-establishmentarianism.

Both are, in many ways, fundamentally anti-American, anti Judeo-Christian civilization and favorable of much more totalitarian arrangements.

The funniest thing about Duginism is when I see these “alt-right” types promoting it when Dugin himself is an anti-white racist who explicitly spelled it out that all he wants is racial tension in the West so as to make it easier to introduce Russian subversion.

The second funniest thing is to see the mainstream Left now suddenly “concerned” about Russia when they themselves have been for quite sometime good fellow travelers for Duginism (most of them unwittingly, but still). (Interviewer: Aleš Ernecl, editor)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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